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work!") is tempered by their other insight ("Markets
fail!"). and one form of market failure is the monopoly
problem. There is, and was from the start a competing
concern (Bork calls it a deviant theme) that would interpret antitrust as against bigness rather than in favor of
competition. This populist view lives a cyclical life of its
own, with its most recent upsurge during the merger
wave of the late 1960's. With the collapse of that
phenomenon it has receded some, but the legislative
proposals it spawned are still around. From this vantage
point, as distinct from 1968, there seems no new, clear, or
present danger of the creation of an industrial oligarchy,
and I would judge the trend (in defining goals for antitrust) is back toward competition. The repeal of the
Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts is a straw in this wind.
While I do not think that the tradition of Brandeis, Black,
Douglas, and Patman will ever wholly disappear, it
seems in a no-growth phase at the moment.
The traditional goal of preserving competition is, in my
view, not only still appropriate for antitrust, but quite
sufficient. There are many other real problems of our
society that demand attention. Some would have us use
the antitrust laws to meet them. There are, for example,
the many recent examples of corporate, union, and
governmental abuse of power. But to turn antitrust enforcement to those abuses would not only divert scarce
resources but would decrease the ability to maintain
competition by warping the view of what activities merit
close surveillance. I remember still the well-intentioned
suggestion made in 1968 by the Mitchell-KleindiestMcClaren team to use the antitrust laws as a major weapon in their planned war against organized crime. Fortunately they were dissuaded. Another suggestion, which
should be resisted as well, is to conceive of antitrust as a
major weapon against inflation. While some current antitrust activities, such as attacks on entry restriction in the
regulated industries, may have a once and for all effect
on the level of prices in some areas, they have virtually
no bearing on the root causes of the rate of increase of
prices that is inflation. The current inflation is occurring
in all sectors of the economy, independent of the vigor of
competition. If this seems a straw man, observe how
quickly most discussions of the "industrial reorganization" proposals get entwined with the current inflation.
If oligopoly power indeed deserves attention, it does so
on its merits, not because of the failures (and there are
many) of our macroeconomic policies. (I am, incidentally, astonished to read that repeal of the Fair Trade
Laws- amply justified on other grounds- occurred
because of the expected effect on inflation. Although it is
nice to be right for the wrong reason once in a while, it is
not reassuring.)
Proposed Legislation
Proposed legislation is a response to perceived inadequacies in the existing policy arsenal. Let me comment
briefly on five areas of alleged deficiency: (1) oligopoly,
(2) mergers, (3) pockets of exempt behavior, (4) execrable unilateral conduct, and (5) treble damages and
other penalties.

Oligopoly
The courts have stubbornly resisted repeated urging to
extend to oligopoly-"shared monopoly power"-the
strict standard of monopolization under Section 2. Those
who saw the Aluminum, Tobacco, and Triangle Conduit
decisions as presaging a "New Sherman Act" before
which oligopoly would fall, were to be disappointed.
This disappointment has led to repeated proposals for
new legislation creating a rebuttable presumption for
deconcentration of highly concentrated industry struc-

tures . Oligopolistic industries exhibit, par excellence,
the competing tensions between the economies of scale
in production and distribution that make large enterprises efficient and the centers of private power that
make them capable of abusing the social good. But these
tensions have existed from the start and are precisely the
ones that make antitrust policy both difficult and important.
There is no credible evidence to suggest that the
oligopoly problem has recently become more acute. Nor
has the structuralist view that high concentration leads
with decisively high probability to adverse performance
won new logical or empirical support. James Rahl, in
1962, concluded that "there is no consensus of scientific,
scholarly, legislative, executive, or judicial opinion in
this country as to the wisdom of doing anything very
basic about" the oligopoly problem, and nothing since
1962 would lead me to modify his conclusion. Indeed, the
current revival of the debate is in response to a challenge
from the other side; Professor Brozen's attack on the
validity pf the association, as a long-run phenomenon,
between high concentration ratios and persistent high
profits. One does not need to take sides in that debate to
read in it a warning against restructuring legislation in
this area. We should legislate from knowledge not from
frustration with our ignorance. It may well be that we
shall one day know enough to justify an Hart-like industrial reorganization bill or a vertical dismemberment of
the oil industry, but I do not believe that that day has
come .
Mergers
In the years since 1950, when mergers came under
effective antitrust control, the courts have adopted very
different standards of the quantum of market power that
is required to trigger a structural antitrust violation. It is
most severe on mergers, next most on market occupancy
by a single firm, and least on shared power. Few would
quarrel with that ordering. The current support for a
merger notification bill may reflect a desire for an even
more restrictive policy toward mergers. It may instead
reflect fear that a more centrist Supreme Court will
sharply retreat from the positions of the Warren Court.
At the very least it suggests a recognition (and a regret)
that the Merger Guidelines, which promised to become
merger policy with a Supreme Court before which "the
government always won," are on their way to the status
of historical curiosities.
How should one evaluate the proposal? Since the large
merger, like the large corporation, is not unambiguously
undesirable, a policy proposal that adds to the inhibitions ought to bear the burden of showing that the
mergers it will stop ought to be stopped. Giving the
Justice Department the power automatically to enjoin
preliminarily (and thus frequently to block permanently) large mergers, supposes a clear need either to move
the judicially determined line or to trust the economic
judgments of the Department of Justice more than those
of the Courts. The second seems doubtful on its merits,
and doubly so because of the mixing of prosecutorial and
judicial functions. As to whether we are now too permissive, I am aware of no evidence that suggests a more
restrictive policy is required, or that absolute size (not
market share) is the relevant measure. The conglomerate
problem, which might have occasioned such legislative
concerns in 1968, no longer does both because of the
decline of the phenomenon and (more basically)
because the Courts have found a way to embrace the
problem using potential competition as a sound but flexible standard for integrating conglomerate diversification into the main corpus of antitrust: the effect on competition.
13

Exemp1ions
Once we get beyond the exemption of labor unions
(and some would challenge even that), virtually every
area of actual or de facto exempt behavior has been subject to debate and proposed legislative challenge. Far the
most important exempt areas are the regulated industries. The presumption underlying Section 11 of the
Clayton Act was that competitive concerns with respect
to the industries they regulate should be delegated to the
ICC, the FCC, the CAB, and the FRB. The implicit faith
was that regulators, as they acquired knowledge of their
industries problems, would not lose the resolve to
achieve the benefits of competition. This faith has been
known to be misdirected for at least a generation. Here,
quite in contrast to the oligopoly and merger areas, there
is today a "scientific and scholarly consensus" that increased reliance on competition in regulated industries
is in order.
Execrable Unilateral Conduct
Unilateral predatory conduct by one lacking the
market power to be charged under Section 2, and lacking
the multiparty conduct to fall within Section 1 is (arguably) a lacuna in present antitrust coverage. It is not
clear to me that there are major adverse competitive consequences in such conduct, but it creates a legal unease
and has invited legislative proposals to close the gap that
may have economic consequences. Of course, there is
always FTC 5, but that is small comfort to the private victim who seeks either injunctive relief or damages.

Penalties
My interest in the size and nature of penalties is their
effect on motivation. It is often argued that the fines
assessable in criminal cases are still ludicrously small
when assessed against large corporations. If such fines
were the only penalties, they would indeed be a primary
deficiency of our present laws. But to discuss intelligently the disincentive effects of an antitrust prosecution, it
is necessary to treat the whole penalty package as one:
the criminal penalties to individuals, the fines, the
staggering costs of litigation, and the damages (single or
treble) in civil suits.
I sense a rising unease about the perverse incentive
effects of mandatory treble damages, particularly when
piggybacked on class action suits. Treble damages were
initially intended to provide a finder's fee to injured
plaintiffs and thus to motivate the rooting out of
violations that might otherwise escape the eye or budget
of the public prosecutor. Even when that economically
sound objective was not served because private suits increasingly came in the train of public suits, treble
damages could be argued to add desirably to the
penalties for violation, and thus both to compensate for
generally inadequate deterrents in public suit penalties
and to create a largely laudable incentive for consent
decrees or nolo pleas in the kind of close cases that it is
desirable to have settled quickly.
Does a different motivation-closer to extortion-without economic or moral justification now come
into play? After issuance of a complaint in a governmental suit, a flood of class action treble damage suits is
all but automatic, and these can be initiated at relatively
little cost. These cases in turn are likely to be collected in
a single court for trial, thus all but assuring they will all
be decided the same way. A defendant determined to
fight the public case on its merits may expose himself to
enormous risk if he should lose. Suppose, to see the issue
clearly, a seller of a commodity with unit value of $100
sold one million units per year over 10 years. If a jury ultimately (albeit wrongly) finds damages of $10 per unit
over the entire period, he faces a $300 million penalty
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(plus attorneys fees). For a company with sales of $100
million per year this is surely an awesome prospect. Suppose his activities were in fact legal, and he does not
wish to accept a consent decree. Surely there is still one
chance in 100 that he will lose both public and private
suits. (Is there ever less chance than that?) The "expected value" of his loss is over $3 million but the loss, if
it occurs, will be ruinous. Is the seller not safer to settle
the private suits before they really begin, for say $2
million (or even $4 million)? It is a risk-prone lawyer
who advises his client otherwise. Yet such thinking invites suits whose only purpose is such a settlement.
Defendants collectively should fight such suits, but acting independently they should not. You know better
than I if this is a real or fancied problem in both "large"
and "small" suits.
If, as I believe, remedies and penalties are a problem
area, it is because the "package" has developed without
plan and without comprehensive review as such factors
as inflation, tax rates, tax rulings, ease of getting standing
for private suits, ease of maintaining class actions, have
changed. Moreover, what is illegal keeps changing in unforeseen ways. It would be remarkable if the present
penalty package was optimal, and there are many
reasons to suppose it is not. If it is to be corrected,
however, it will benefit from looking at as a whole rather
than piecemeal.

"In my view we have a vital and evolving
national antitrust policy . . . The more
striking current proposals for legislative reform
seem to me dictated by ideology rather than
by evidence of malfunction, and by broader
concerns about the nature of our society than
can sensibly be implemented through
an antitrust policy."

Deficiencies in Current Policies
Even in my relatively sanguine review, there are visible deficiencies in three areas: unwise exemptions, unilateral predatory conduct, and damages and penalties
considered broadly. Are these prime candidates for
legislative reform? I think not.
The whole history of antitrust in this country gives
pause against heavy reliance on the statutory remedy. As
a statutory field, antitrust invites statutory reform. But
the basic statute was constitution-like in its language and
provided the invitation, if not the necessity, to the
judiciary to develop a common law of antitrust. Such
judicial interpretation has frequently led to dissatisfaction and to subsequent legislative reform. But the corrective legislation seldom promptly accomplished what
it intended and it often invited adaptive responses that
were adverse. Both the FTC Act and the Clayton Act
were legislative responses to the first two decades of the
Sherman Act- each was intended to correct deficiencies
tha t by 1914 bothered the populists and/or the business
community. Hardly any feature of either act worked as
intended. Neither the creation of the FTC as a specialized agency which, with professional expertise, was expected to fashion a sensible law of restraints of trade nor
the incredibly detailed language of Clayton Sections 2 or
3 succeeded in taking discretion from the fe deral courts

or created the certainty that business wanted. Neither
Act resolved the latent conflict between preservation of
competition and protection of small competitors. The
original Section 7, attempting to meet a demonstrated
failure to cope with the merger problem. probably did
more damage than good, by inducing asset acquisitions.
It was to be 36 years before a sound antimerger statute
was enacted. This Cellar-Kefauver Act-surely the
triumph in the post Sherman Act legislative history-succeeded because it was legislation based upon
knowledge, not on ignorance, on recognized deficiencies,
not vague unease. There ought to be a lesson in that. As
to the other major legislative attempts: Webb-Pomerene, Miller-Tydings, McGuire, and Robinson-Patman,
the less said the better. They surely do not make legislation (other than repeal) seem promising.
If detailed legislative reform has been one of the unhappy experiences in antitrust, judicial abdication has
been the other. Both in the early twenties when the spirit
was "anything goes," and in the mid 60's when everything went, delegation of the defense of competition
either to private conscience, or to the Justice Department's prosecutorial discretion seems to me to have been
unsatisfactory.
Notwithstanding everyone's ability to conjure up a
collection of horrors in Supreme Court decision making,

"Since the large merger, like the large
corporation, is not unambiguously undesirable,
a policy proposal that adds to the inhibitions
ought to bear the burden of showing that the
mergers it will stop ought to be stopped."

it has been judicial construction and evolution that (with
Sherman 1 and 2 and the revised Clayton Section 7) has
developed and continues to develop a national antitrust
policy. In broad outline it is both effective and sensible
and has shown a remarkable ability to evolve and to
adapt to changes in both social mood and whatever
scientific and scholarly consensus exists.
We forget, I think, that antitrust is younger than its
years. In terms of a period of sustained interest and
attention it really dates only from the end of World War
II. Before that we had no sustained period with both executive willingness to push it, and judicial willingness to
explore the outer boundaries; since then there have
been no periods of hiatus. In virtually every area except
simple price fixing, antitrust has come a long way, since
1945. (Indeed in some areas it has, in my view, come too
far, but there I have little doubt, a more nearly balanced
court can find its way back.)
While all of this leads me to a presumption against a
legislative reform if a judicial response is possible, the
presumption is of course rebuttable. Legislation has
worked well where there is a well-defined need, where
there is a consensus as to what and how to proceed, and
where the possibilities of unsatisfactory side effects
seem small. Thus, the Cellar-Kefauver Act seemed a
happier response to the merger problem than a

stretching of Section 1. With respect to the principal present deficiency areas I am not presently persuaded.
1. The erosion of areas of de facto exempt behavior is
progressing constructively without new legislation. Goldfarb has opened the possibility of bringing professional
services generally into a single antitrust policy; the
doubtful special treatment of professional sports seems
unlikely to long survive; most important, the fringes of
regulation are being opened up to doses of entry and
competition, and a more massive rethinking of
regulatory policy is underway. While that rethinking
may in due course entail new legislation, at the moment
conventional avenues of reform seem to be effective.
Indeed, the Justice Department's AT&T suit seems at
least as much an attack on past regulatory decisions as on
any of Ma Bell's activities.
2. While a new statute could deal with unilateral
predatory conduct by defining unfair competition as a
crime open to private plaintiffs, I doubt if it could be
limited to socially undesirable practices. My fear is that
such a statute would, like Robinson-Patman, tend to
shield competitors at the expense of competition more
often than it would be pro-competitive. The stubborn
vitality of the Robinson-Patman Act despite the all but
unanimous view of disinterested observers that it is an
anticompetitive statute, is not reassuring. The small businessman, the harassed distributor, and the generally unaggressive competitor are too numerous to make the
legislative arena a prominent source of reform. I think
the dangers of bad legislation are sufficiently large here,
that it is, if necessary, preferable to live with the problem. Of course, the unilateral execrable conduct lacuna
(if it is that) may be reached without new legislation,
though at the expense of keeping the Section 2
"Attempts" standard fuzzy. Such behavior could be embraced by the courts' further eroding of the quantum of
power that constitutes monopoly (thus bringing ever
closer the thing of which there is a dangerous probability) or by following Professor Turner's suggestion of
accepting a trade-off between power and conduct such
that in the face of foul conduct without redeeming value,
one forgets to look further for power. While there is
much to be said against a fuzzy standard, such as now
governs Section 2 attempts cases, there is something to be
said for it if the alternative is bad enough.
3. Finally we come to penalties. My problem here is
that I have no sense that a coherent consensus of what to
do exists, and that is a dangerous posture from which to
draft legislation. The need for a coordinated view of both
private and public penalties seems crucial, yet difficult
to manage, and none of the current legislative proposals
attempts one. To neglect such coordination is to neglect
the evident fact that the private suit and the public one
go hand in glove and that the private penalties provide
the major deterrents. Is the new schedule of penalties
provided by the Tunney bill sensible? Surely it depends
on how the courts expand or contract the private suit.
Here again evolution seems to be at work. If Bigelow
opened up the private suit at the beginning of the
modern era, Eisen may have started to limit its potential
for becoming the tail that wags the dog.
Let me come, at last, to the title question. In my view
we have a vital and evolving national antitrust policy. It
seems certain, no matter which party controls the
government, that we will continue to have an Antitrust
Division that enforces this policy and a ttempts to change
its limits, and a judiciary that shapes it to the world it
sees. The more striking current proposals for legislative
reform seem to me dictated by ideology rather than by
evidence of malfunction, and by broader concerns about
the nature of our society than can sensibly be implemented through an antitrust policy.
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